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Abstract
We show that the confluence of rising home prices, declining interest rates, and near-
frictionless refinancing opportunities can lead to substantial risk in the financial system. The
interaction between these three factors causes an unintentional synchronization of homeowner
leverage. Coupled with the indivisibility and sole ownership of residential real estate—which
prevents homeowners from deleveraging when property values decline—this synchronization
conspires to create a “ratchet” effect in homeowners’ leverage. To assess the magnitude of
potential risk through this mechanism, we simulate the U.S. housing market with and with-
out equity extractions and estimate the losses absorbed by mortgage lenders by valuing the
embedded put-option in non-recourse mortgages. In our simulation, this mechanism alone
can generate losses of $1.7 trillion from June 2006 to December 2008, compared with sim-
ulated losses of $330 billion in the absence of equity extractions. Irrespective of its role in
the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, the refinancing ratchet effect is a new and more complex
form of systemic risk in the residential mortgage system that does not rely on any of the
dysfunctional behaviors on which most studies of the crisis are based.
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1 Introduction
Home mortgage loans—one of the most widely used financial products by U.S. consumers—
are collateralized mainly by the value of the underlying real estate.1 This feature makes
the market value of the collateral very important in measuring the risk of a mortgage.2 To
reduce the risk of default, mortgage lenders usually ask for a down payment of 10% to 20%
of the value of the home from the borrower, creating an “equity buffer” that absorbs the
first losses from home price declines. Any event or action that reduces the value of this
buffer, e.g., an equity extraction or a drop in home values, increases the risk of the lending
institution.
A number of secular trends over the last two decades, including the increased efficiency of
the refinancing process and the growth of the refinancing business, have made it much easier
for homeowners to refinance their mortgages to take advantage of declining interest rates,
increasing housing prices, or both. Consequences of these trends have been documented
by Greenspan and Kennedy (2008, p. 120), who observe, “since the mid-1980s, mortgage
debt has grown more rapidly than home values, resulting in a decline in housing wealth as
a share of the value of homes.” They attribute most of this effect to discretionary equity
extractions via home sales, “cash-out” refinancing (where the homeowner receives cash after
the refinancing), and home-equity loans.
In this paper, we focus on a previously unstudied dimension of risk in the mortgage
market: the interplay among the growth of the refinancing business, the decline in interest
rates, and the appreciation of property values. Each of these three trends is systemically
neutral or positive when considered in isolation, but when they occur simultaneously, the
results can be explosive. We argue that during periods of rising house prices, falling interest
rates, and increasingly competitive and efficient refinancing markets, cash-out refinancing is
1 Although most models of household finance assume that residential mortgages are non-recourse loans,
the legal procedure for foreclosure and obtaining a deficiency judgment is complex, varying greatly from
state to state. In fact, Ghent and Kudlyak (2009, Table 1) observe that home mortgages are explicitly
non-recourse in only 11 states. Not surprisingly, some of those states are experiencing severe foreclosure
problems in the current crisis such as Arizona and California. However, in certain populous states with
recourse, such as Florida and Texas, generous homestead-exemption laws can make it virtually impossible
for lenders to collect on deficiency judgments because borrowers can easily shield their assets. Ghent and
Kudlyak (2009) study the effect of lender recourse on mortgage defaults across the U.S. and conclude that
recourse does decrease the probability of default for homeowners who have negative equity.
2 See, for example, Danis and Pennington-Cross (2005); Downing, Stanton, and Wallace (2005); Gerardi,
Shapiro, and Willen (2007); Doms, Furlong, and Krainer (2007); Bajari, Chu, and Park (2008); Bhardwaj
and Sengupta (2008a); and Gerardi et al. (2008).
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like a ratchet. It incrementally increases homeowner leverage as real-estate values appreciate
without the ability to symmetrically decrease leverage by increments as real-estate values
decline. This self-synchronizing “ratchet effect” can create significant systemic risk in an
otherwise geographically and temporally diverse pool of mortgages.
The potential magnitude of the risk created due to the refinancing ratchet effect is most
clearly illustrated though a hypothetical scenario in which all homeowners decide to keep
their leverage at a level generally associated with extreme prudence and good lending prac-
tices, for example, a loan-to-value (LTV) of 80% for a conventional fully-amortizing 30-year
fixed-rate mortgage. Suppose the refinancing market is so competitive, i.e., refinancing costs
are so low and capital is so plentiful, that homeowners are able to extract any equity above
the minimum each month. In such an extreme case, cash-out refinancing has the same effect
as if all mortgages were re-originated at the peak of the housing market. When home prices
fall, as they must eventually, the ratchet “locks” because homeowners cannot easily unwind
their real-estate positions and incrementally deleverage due to indivisibility and illiquidity.
The unintentional synchronization of leverage during the market’s rise naturally leads to
an apparent shift in regime during the market’s decline, in which historically uncorrelated
defaults now become highly correlated.3
Indivisibility and sole ownership of residential real-estate are two special characteristics
of this asset class that make addressing this issue particularly challenging. The impact of
indivisibility can be crystallized by comparing an investment in residential real estate with
a leveraged investment in a typical exchange-traded instrument such as shares of common
stock. While the latter is subject to both an initial margin requirement as well as a main-
tenance margin requirement, home mortgages only have a homeowner equity requirement
that plays a role similar to that of an initial margin. It is hard to imagine that homeowners
would willingly finance large capital purchases using short-term debt like margin accounts,
and long-term debt may have become the standard method for financing home purchases
precisely because of the indivisible nature of the collateral. Furthermore, the owner is typi-
cally the sole equityholder in an owner-occupied residential property which makes it difficult
to bring incrementally additional capital in to reduce risk by issuing new equity.
These two special features of residential real estate create an important asymmetry in
3If mortgages were recourse loans and borrowers had uncorrelated sources of income, the aggregate risk
of the mortgage market would be lower. However, as discussed in footnote 1, recourse does not exist in all
states; hence this diversification channel is not always available.
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the housing market that does not exist in most financial markets. While a leveraged investor
may decide not to incrementally deleverage as prices decline due to optimistic expectations
of a price reversal, the indivisibility and sole ownership of owner-occupied homes makes
incremental deleveraging impossible, even for those who want to reduce their exposure to
real estate. Therefore, the only option available to homeowners in a declining market is to
sell their homes, recognize their capital losses, and move into less expensive properties that
satisfy their desired LTV ratio. The enormous costs—both financial and psychological—of
such a transaction make it a highly impractical and implausible response to addressing the
issue raised in this paper.
We propose to gauge the magnitude of the potential risk caused by the refinancing ratchet
effect by creating a numerical simulation of the U.S. housing and mortgage markets. By cal-
ibrating our simulation to the existing stock of real estate, and by specifying reasonable
behavioral rules for the typical homeowner’s equity extraction decision—which satisfy com-
mon standards of prudence and good lending practices in the U.S.—our simulation can match
some of the major trends in this market over the past decade such as the rapid rise in the
amount of mortgages outstanding and the massive equity extractions from U.S. residential
mortgages during this period. We are able to show that refinancing-facilitated home-equity
extractions alone can create significant risk in the residential mortgage system.
Using a standard derivatives-pricing model, we construct an estimate of losses absorbed
by mortgage lenders—banks, asset management firms, and government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs)—from the decline in real-estate prices and compare these estimates with the scenario
of no equity extractions over the same period. Our simulation yields an approximate loss
of $1.7 trillion from the housing-market decline since June 2006 compared to a loss of $330
billion if no equity had been extracted from U.S. residential real estate during the boom.
While we have attempted to construct as realistic a simulation as possible, we acknowl-
edge at the outset that our approach is intended to capture “reduced-form” relations and
is not based on a general equilibrium model of households and mortgage lenders. Instead
of relying on a stylized general equilibrium model, we adopt a simple refinancing rule that
seems to capture plausible behavior among U.S. homeowners over the recent past. Also,
we do not model the supply of refinancing and the behavior of lenders, but rather assume
that households can refinance as much as they wish at prevailing historical interest rates.
While the plentiful supply of credit had been close to reality during the decade leading up to
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the peak of the housing market in June 2006, our motivation for this assumption is to iso-
late the impact of the refinancing ratchet effect. Lending behavior undoubtedly contributed
to the magnitude of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, as did many other factors (see Lo,
2012, for a review of the burgeoning crisis literature). An empirically accurate stochastic
dynamic general equilibrium model of the housing and mortgage markets that endogenizes
these factors is a much more challenging undertaking and beyond the scope of this paper.
Our objective is not to explain the crisis, but rather to show that even in the absence
of any dysfunctional behavior such as excessive risk-taking, fraud, regulatory forbearance,
political intervention, and predatory borrowing and lending, large system-wide shocks can
occur in the housing and mortgage markets. The refinancing ratchet effect is a considerably
more subtle and complex form of systemic risk, arising from the confluence of three familiar
and individually welfare-improving economic trends. The simplicity of our simulation ap-
proach makes the refinancing ratchet effect more transparent, and the potential magnitude
of its impact suggests that further attention is warranted.
We begin in Section 2 with a brief review of the literature, and Section 3 provides some
basic facts about the U.S. mortgage system. We outline the design of our simulation and
describe the results of the calibration exercise in Section 4. We use these results in conjunc-
tion with a simple option-pricing model in Section 5 to estimate the impact of mortgage
refinancing on the aggregate risk of the U.S. mortgage market as home prices declined from
2006 to 2008. We provide some qualifications for and extensions of our results in Section 6,
and conclusions in Section 7.
2 Literature Review
Given the magnitude of the subprime mortgage crisis, a number of recent papers have at-
tempted to trace its root causes. Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008), Demyanyk and Van
Hemert (2008), Bhardwaj and Sengupta (2008b), Keys et al. (2008), and Mian and Su (2008)
are only a few of the examples in this vast and growing literature. While the issues discussed
in these papers, such as lax lending standards and the impact of institutional changes like
securitization or the expansion of the subprime market, were certainly of primary impor-
tance in causing the recent crisis, none of these papers have focused on the unique interplay
between refinancing and systemic risk in the residential mortgage system that we examine
in this paper.
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The uncertain durations and credit risk of mortgages—due to prepayment or default by
the borrower—make their risks different from other fixed-income products. The approach to
modeling these risks can be divided into two categories: structural and reduced-form. Struc-
tural models focus on the underlying dynamics of the collateral value and the interest rates
to arrive at a model of consumer behavior, while reduced-form models take a more statistical
approach. Kau, Keenan, Muller, and Epperson (1992, 1995) and Kau and Keenan (1995)
provide some early examples of the structural approach while Schwartz and Torous (1989),
Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000), and Deng and Quigley (2002) take the reduced-form
approach in their studies. LaCour-Little (2008) provides a recent review of this literature.
The earliest structural models adopted simplifying assumptions that yielded elegant
closed-form solutions at the expense of certain stylized facts of the U.S. mortgage market
that could not be captured by those assumptions. For example, consider the decision to de-
fault on a mortgage. The value of the underlying real estate is obviously the most important
factor in driving this decision. However, while negative equity may be a necessary condition
to trigger default, it is apparently not sufficient (Foote, Gerardi, and Willen, 2008), perhaps
due to concerns such as moving costs, the desire to preserve reputational capital, default
penalties, or even sentimental attachment to the home.4 Similarly, homeowners seeking to
refinance into a lower interest-rate mortgage when rates decline may be constrained by their
financial circumstances or insufficient amounts of equity in their homes.5
Such complexities make complete modeling of risk in the residential mortgage system
challenging. To avoid the possibility that our main message could be lost while dealing with
these complexities, we have adopted a simple yet realistic behavioral rule that can be easily
understood and allows us to focus on the main subject of our paper. Our approach for
evaluating risk and pricing mortgage guarantees uses option-pricing technology that makes
the analytical aspects of our approach closer to the structural models.
We argue that the increasing familiarity of borrowers with the refinancing process; the
invention of new mortgage products; and the corresponding institutional, social, and political
changes over the last decade contributed to an environment fertile for the type of risk that
is the focus of this paper. Other researchers have studied and commented on this topic
4Stanton (1995) and Downing, Stanton, and Wallace (2005) incorporate some of these effects into their
models of mortgage termination.
5Archer, Ling, and McGill (1997) and Peristiani et al. (1997) consider the impact of household financial
conditions such as income, credit history, and the amount of homeowner’s equity on the ability to refinance.
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as well. For example, by comparing the refinancing decision of homeowners in the 1980s
relative to the 1990s, Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani (2001) find evidence that over time, a
combination of technological, regulatory, and structural changes has reduced the net benefit
needed to trigger a refinancing decision. They conjecture that homeowners’ familiarity with
the refinancing process and their increased financial sophistication are possible drivers behind
this phenomenon.6
Two examples of new mortgage products that enabled easier refinancing are the “sub-
prime” and “Alt-A” mortgages. As Mayer and Pence (2008, p. 1) observe, “these new
products not only allowed new buyers to access credit, but also made it easier for homeown-
ers to refinance loans and withdraw cash from houses that had appreciated in value.” They
point out that “subprime mortgages are used a bit more for refinancing than home purchase”
and “almost all subprime refinances are cash-out refinances” (Mayer and Pence, 2008, p. 10).
Moreover, some of the more exotic products like non- or negative-amortization mortgages
are contractual equivalents to dynamic strategies involving frequent cash-out refinancing to
maintain a desired leverage ratio. These product innovations may have facilitated large-
scale equity extractions by making refinancing significantly easier, cheaper, and virtually
automatic.7
The behavioral and social aspects of the decision to default on a residential mortgage is
considered by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) using surveys of American households in
late 2008 and early 2009. They find that those who consider it immoral to default are 77%
less likely to declare their intention to do so. They also find that households who have been
exposed to defaults are more willing to default strategically, i.e., to default even though they
can afford their mortgage payments. For example, holding social stigma constant, individuals
who know someone who defaulted strategically are 82% more likely to declare their intention
to do so. And as defaults become more common within a given social network, the social
stigma of default is likely to decline, lowering the threshold for new defaults to occur.
6 Specifically, they compare the refinancing behavior during two major refinancing cycles: 1986–1987
and 1992–1993. They find that measurable transactions costs, such as points and fees, are quite important
in the refinancing decision, and these costs have declined over time due to competition and growth in the
refinancing market. However, even after controlling for these costs and other factors that are known to
impact the refinancing decision, the estimated refinancing probability is still considerably higher in the later
part of their sample (9% vs. 14%; see Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani, 2001, pp. 970–971). Motivated by this
analysis, we will propose refinancing rules with a structural break in the year 1988 (see Appendix A.3).
7Many of these innovations may also have important tax or transaction-cost benefits to the borrower;
hence they may have been demand-driven rather than the result of overly aggressive mortgage lenders. In
fact, these products may be essential for achieving optimal risk-sharing, Piskorski and Tchistyi (2006).
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Perhaps a similar set of forces was at play during the most recent cash-out refinancing
boom. Institutional changes, heightened competition, and technological advances made it
easier and cheaper for consumers to engage in mortgage refinancing, and increased awareness
of and familiarity with the refinancing process made it more popular. Even though many
homeowners were undoubtedly aware of the potential dangers of equity extractions, the fact
that many of their neighbors or co-workers were extracting equity from their homes made it
more socially acceptable to do so at the height of the housing boom.
3 Basic Facts About the U.S. Mortgage Market
We begin with some basic facts about the overall size and trends of the U.S. mortgage market
that are most relevant for our study. Figure 1 shows the time series of conventional 30-year
fixed-rate mortgage rates, and purchase and refinancing mortgage-origination volumes in the
U.S. from the first quarter of 1991 (1991Q1) to the fourth quarter of 2008 (2008Q4).8
The data collected by the Mortgage Bankers Association breaks down origination volume
into two components: origination of loans intended for new purchase, and those intended for
refinancing purposes. Refinancing volume can be further broken down by loan type based on
the data collected by the U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), formerly the Office
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). In particular, FHFA data, available
at http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=87 classifies loans into the following three
categories: Purchase, Cash-Out Refinancing, and Rate/Term Refinancing.
Several prominent themes emerge from Figure 1. While purchase volume is highly sea-
sonal, the increase and subsequent decline closely matches the trend in overall real-estate
prices. There is also a clear relationship between decline in mortgage rates and rate-
refinancing volume. For example, the decline in interest rates in the early 1990s is followed
by a period of high rate-refinancing activity from 1992 to 1993. The next period of increased
rate-refinancing occurs in 1998, again coinciding with a drop in mortgage rates. However,
the most active period of rate refinancing takes place in 2001Q4 through 2003Q3, where the
average volume is $342 billion per quarter, far exceeding the peak of each of the previous two
refinancing booms. There is also indirect evidence that mortgage-lending competition in-
8The interest-rate data is the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”)30-Year
fixed-rate mortgages series available from http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/. The Mortgage Origina-
tion Volume data is obtained from Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) publications available from
http://www.mbaa.org/ResearchandForecasts/EconomicOutlookandForecasts.
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creased during this period—according to Freddie Mac’s surveys (see www.freddiemac.com),
the average number of points associated with conventional 30-year fixed-rate mortgages de-
clined from 1.8 in December 1997 to 1.0 in December 1998 to 0.6 in December 2002, and to
0.7 by June 2009.
Home-equity extraction is a process in which a homeowner converts a portion of the
equity in the home into cash by retiring the existing loan and taking out a new and larger
loan. Such loans are categorized as “cash-out” refinancing in the FHFA data set. It is
not surprising that equity extraction is more common in a rising real-estate market because
during such periods, homeowners’ equity increases dollar-for-dollar with home prices, giving
homeowners more equity to extract. Figure 1 documents a seemingly permanent increase
in cash-out refinance volume in the second half of the sample. The first peak in cash-
out refinancing occurs in 1998Q4, when volume surpasses $100 billion for the first time.
Although the volume in the following 9 quarters (1999Q1 to 2001Q1) was less than $100
billion per quarter, the average value of cash-out refinancing per quarter was $204 billion
in the subsequent 30 quarters (2001Q2 to 2008Q3), far exceeding the average value in the
preceding 41 quarters from 1991Q1 to 2001Q1. Not surprisingly, as home prices fell from
2006 to 2008, cash-out refinancing volume rapidly subsided, declining to only $84 billion in
the last quarter of 2008.
Figure 2 shows the relation between gross equity extraction and aggregate U.S. home
prices during the period from 1991Q1 to 2008Q4.9 The increase and subsequent decline
in the gross equity extraction closely mirrors the pattern of aggregate U.S. residential real-
estate prices. According to this estimate, U.S. homeowners extracted an average of $160
billion in each of the 32 quarters between 1999Q3 to 2007Q2, far outstripping the $87 billion
extracted during the previous peak in 1998Q4.
Other things being equal, equity extraction leads to a larger mortgage on a given home,
implying a link between the amount of equity extracted and the volume of mortgages out-
standing that is confirmed in Figure 3. This figure shows that outstanding mortgages grew
from $2,648 billion in 1991Q1 to a peak of $11,142 billion in 2008Q1. During this period,
homeowners extracted $6,720 billion in equity. These figures suggest that equity extractions
represent a non-trivial portion of outstanding mortgages, and the risk transferred from home-
9The estimates of gross equity extractions are from Greenspan and Kennedy (2005). We are grateful to
Jim Kennedy for providing us with updated estimates. See Appendix A.1 for details.
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Figure 1: 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rates, and purchase, cash-out refinancing, and rate-
refinancing origination volume from 1991Q1 to 2008Q4.
Figure 2: The appreciation in and subsequent decline of U.S. residential real-estate values, as
measured by the S&P/Case-Shiller Composite-10 Home Price Index, and the corresponding
growth of equity extractions from 1991Q1 to 2008Q4. The equity extraction data is based
on Greenspan and Kennedy (2005).
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owners to the financial sector due to these extractions may have had a significant impact on
the overall risk exposure of this sector to real-estate prices. The objective of the simulation
in this paper is to quantify this effect.
Figure 3: Cumulative equity extractions and the growth in the volume of U.S. residential
mortgages outstanding from 1991Q1 to 2008Q4. The equity extraction data is based on
Greenspan and Kennedy (2005), and outstanding residential-mortgage volume is reported
by the Federal Reserve as “Personal Sector Home Mortgages Liability.”
4 Simulating the U.S. Mortgage Market
In this section we provide the details of our simulation approach and report the results of
our calibration exercise for different simulation scenarios.
4.1 Simulation Assumptions
In designing our simulation, we must balance the desire for realism against the availability of
data and the tractability of the computations required. To that end, we make the following
assumptions:
(A1) Each house is purchased at an initial LTV ratio drawn from a distribution that is fixed
through time and does not have any geographical dependency.
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(A2) All homes are purchased with conventional fixed-rate mortgages that are non-recourse
loans with initial maturity drawn from a distribution that is fixed through time and
does not have geographical dependency.
(A3) The market value of homes follows a geometric random walk with a mean given by a
“Home Price Index” and volatility given by “Home Price Volatility”. We incorporate
geographical heterogeneity into the Home Price Index but assume that home price
Volatility is constant through time and across all regions.
(A4) We allow homeowners the possibility of engaging in ”Cash-Out Refinancing” or “Rate
Refinancing” in each month.
(A5) For Cash-Out Refinancing, we assume that the ith homeowner’s decision is random
with probability REFIi,t which is a function only of the current equity in the home and
the prevailing mortgage rate. In particular, we assume that the refinancing decision
does not depend on factors such as the price and age of the home, or the time elapsed
since any previous refinancing. We also assume that the homeowner will refinance into
a new loan with the initial LTV ratio and maturity specified in Assumptions (A1) and
(A2).
(A6) The owners will engage in a Rate Refinancing as soon as mortgage rates have fallen by
more than the “ Rate Refinance Threshold” (RRT) from the existing mortgage rate.
The new mortgage is assumed to have the same maturity as the existing mortgage,
and the principal of the new mortgage is equal to the remaining value of the existing
mortgage. Therefore, the homeowner will save in monthly payments due to the lower
mortgage rate, but no equity is extracted.
(A7) Homeowners’ refinancing decisions are random and independent of each other, apart
from the dependence explicitly parameterized in the refinancing rule.
(A8) Once fully paid for, a home will not re-enter the housing market.
(A9) We do not incorporate taxes or transaction costs explicitly into our simulations.
Given the central role that these assumptions play in our simulations and their interpretation,
a few words about their motivation are in order.
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Assumptions (A1) and (A2) determine the initial leverage and type of mortgages we
assume for new homeowners. Here we have assumed the initial LTV distribution did not
change throughout time and all mortgages were standard and fully-amortizing mortgages. Of
course, in the years leading up to the peak of the housing market in 2006, considerably more
aggressive and exotic loans were made, including the now-infamous NINJA (“no income, no
job or assets”) mortgages and many others with embedded options. Assumptions (A1) and
(A2) are motivated by our desire for simplicity; we also wish to err on the side of caution
with respect to default-related loss implications wherever possible.
Assuming that mortgages are non-recourse loans greatly simplifies our simulations be-
cause we do not need to model the dynamics of other sources of collateral. However, by
assuming that lenders have no recourse to any other sources of collateral, our simulation
may yield over-estimates of potential losses, and it may also oversimplify the behavior of
borrowers (see Ghent and Kudlyak, 2009). To take on the more complex challenge of match-
ing the mix of recourse and non-recourse loans in the mortgage system in our simulations,
we would require information about the types of recourse that are permitted and the practi-
calities of enforcing deficiency judgments in each of the fifty states, as well as cross-sectional
and time-series properties of homeowner income levels, assets, and liabilities. While this
task is beyond the scope of our current study, it is not insurmountable given sufficient time,
resources, and access to financial data at the household level.
Assumption (A3) allows us to calibrate the price dynamics of our simulated housing stock,
and the dynamics we have assumed are consistent with the standard weighted-repeat-sales
index construction methodology (see, for example, Calhoun, 1996). We introduce geograph-
ical heterogeneity in the mean home price appreciation rate but assume that volatility is
constant. Once again, these assumptions are meant to err on the conservative side. For
example, it is likely that home price volatility spiked in regions with sharp price declines, or
after national price levels dropped; we ignore such empirical regularities in our simulations.
Assumptions (A4)–(A6) are simple behavioral rules meant to encapsulate the economic
deliberations of homeowners as they decide whether or not to refinance. Accordingly, im-
plicit in these rules are many factors that we do not model explicitly, e.g., transactions costs,
opportunity costs, homeowner characteristics such as income and risk preferences, macroe-
conomic conditions, and social norms. While it may be possible to derive similar rules from
first principles (e.g., Stanton, 1995), the computational challenges may outweigh the benefits,
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especially from the perspective of producing estimates of potential losses for the aggregate
housing sector.
Assumptions (A5) and (A6) outline the two polar opposites of our simulated refinancing
activities—(A5) describes the situation where owners decide to increase their mortgage debt
to extract equity from their homes while (A6) describes the situation where owners do not
change the size of their mortgage debt but refinance to take advantage of declining interest
rates. Clearly a number of intermediate cases can be considered, but we focus only on these
two extremes to delineate the boundaries that separate them.
Implicit in (A4)–(A6) is the assumption that the supply of credit to households is in-
finitely elastic at prevailing market rates, and it is motivated by our interest in measuring
the impact of household refinancing behavior in and of itself. The complexities of consumer
credit markets warrant a separate simulation study focusing on just those issues.
Assumption (A7) requires some clarification because the refinancing rules in (A5) and
(A6) imply that refinancing decisions are not independent across households. Assumption
(A7) simply states that there are no other sources of dependence (e.g., peer pressure and
social norms arising from the refinancing activity of neighbors). The only channel through
which refinancing decisions are correlated across households in our simulation is through
interest rates and home prices via the behavioral rules in (A5) and (A6). Remarkably, this
single source of commonality is sufficient to generate an enormous amount of synchronized
losses when home prices decline. Finally, assumption (A8) is motivated primarily by the
desire for simplicity, and can easily be amended to allow fully paid houses to re-enter the
real-estate market.
Ignoring issues such as relocation or renting vs. owning is not likely to affect our estimates
of aggregate risk and losses. For example, consider the case of an individual who decides to
rent after selling for $200,000 a home that was recently purchased for $100,000 with a down
payment of $15,000. Assuming a 0% interest rate for simplicity, this fortunate individual has
taken $115,000 of equity out of the housing market. However, the new buyer of this home
will likely borrow all but 10% to 20% of the purchase price. For the purpose of measuring
aggregate risk, this transaction is virtually identical to a cash-out refinancing by the original
homeowner.
Assumption (A9) is a standard simplification but is not equivalent to the usual “per-
fect markets” assumption where taxes and transactions costs are assumed to be zero. In
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fact, assuming away market frictions may seem particularly incongruous in the context of a
simulation of refinancing activity, which some consider to be driven largely by transactions
costs. Assumption (A9) does not assert that these frictions do not exist, but merely that
we do not model their impact on behavior explicitly. Instead, our behavioral rules for the
homeowner’s refinancing decision implicitly incorporate these costs into our simulation in a
“reduced-form” manner.
With these assumptions in place, we can now turn to the specific inputs of the simulation.
4.2 Simulation Input Data
Our simulations depend on a number of input parameters and time series, which this section
describes. To conserve space, we have summarized the data used to calibrate our simula-
tions in Table 1 and left the more detailed information to Appendix A.2. For three of our
parameters, “Rates Refinance Threshold,” “LTV Refinance Threshold,” and “Prepayment
Probability” (see Table 1 for definitions), we were unable to find appropriate data to calibrate
their behavior over time. In lieu of formal calibration, we set these parameters to plausible
values. We can report, however, that we have conducted a series of sensitivity analyses and
our results are not sensitive to the levels of these parameters.
4.3 Calibration Reference Series
Our goal is to calibrate the parameters of our refinancing model so that the simulation results
come as close as possible to matching the following two historical time series:
1. Outstanding Mortgage Volume. We use the value of residential mortgage liabilities
as reported in the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts. This data is available at
a quarterly frequency from 1951Q4 to 2008Q4, and annually from 1945 to 1951.
2. Equity Extractions. We use the series produced by Greenspan and Kennedy (2005),
which is available at a quarterly frequency from 1968Q1 to 2008Q4. Although their ap-
proach decomposes the “Total Gross Equity Extractions” series into three components
(home sales, home equity loans net of unscheduled payments, and cash-out refinanc-
ing), we use their aggregated series in our calibration process. This is motivated by the
fact that home sales and cash-out refinancing have a similar impact on the aggregate
risk of the housing market (see Appendix A.1 for further details).
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4.4 Parameterization of the Refinancing Probability
In our simulations, we follow the evolution of the value of each home as well as its outstanding
mortgage from when it first enters the mortgage system until the mortgage is fully paid and,
according to assumption (A8), it exits the mortgage system. The simulation takes in a
number of input series and parameters as given in Table 1.
To ensure that our simulation is computationally feasible given the computing power
available to us, we simulate 1000 paths for homes that enter the mortgage system in a given
year. Therefore, for each complete run of our simulations, we simulate approximately 1.1
million individual simulation paths. For each simulation path, we keep track of home value,
interest rate, mortgage outstanding, and several option-based risk measures. The information
is then aggregated to arrive at system-wide time series of interest such as total mortgage
debt outstanding, total equity extracted, and our various option-based risk metrics.
The path each home follows is driven by factors such as the evolution of mean home
prices, mortgage rates, and the realization of idiosyncratic home price movement around the
mean home price, as well as the owners’ refinancing decisions as described in Assumptions
(A5) and (A6). The main driver of our simulation results is REFIi,t (see Assumption (A5)),
which determines the probability that homeowner i may participate in a cash-out refinancing
in month t. We assume that REFIi,t has the following functional form:
REFIi,t = (LTVi,t < 75%) [Base Refinancing Rate +
(MRt < MRi,0)× Refinancing Intensity(t)] i . (1)
Our motivation for selecting this particular characterization requires some discussion. As
noted earlier, our object in this paper is to construct a simple yet realistic simulation that
matches the size and growth of the U.S. residential mortgage system and to use that to study
the potential risk caused by the refinancing ratchet effect alone. This objective reduces the
burden on us to have a rule in place that is plausible for the behavior of owners. The par-
ticular characterization proposed here is simple, yet it has a number of intuitively plausible
properties. First, its assumed form ensures that owners do not participate in a cash-out
refinancing unless they have at least 25% equity in their home. Given the assumed distri-
bution for the initial LTV, this constraint ensures that individuals participate in cash-out
17
refinancing only after they have had time to build some equity above their initial equity level.
For those owners who satisfy this LTV constraint, the refinancing intensity has two parts.
One part, given by the “Base Refinancing Rate,” is constant through time and independent
of the rate on the outstanding mortgage relative to the prevailing market rate. The sec-
ond component, given by “Refinancing Intensity(t),” is active when the rate on the current
mortgage, MRi,0, is above the prevailing rate of MRt. This second component can be a
function of time. In fact, in some of our simulations we assume that refinancing intensity
increases through time perhaps due to technological change, consumer familiarity, or other
such factors. Ultimately, the ability of this model to capture the main drivers of refinancing
trends will be judged by the success in reproducing the calibration time series. We turn to
this issue in the next section.
4.5 Calibration Results
The calibration of our simulation consists of finding a base refinancing rate and a refinancing
intensity function that can produce the Outstanding Mortgage Volume and Equity Extrac-
tions time series of Section 4.3. Since the time series used in these calibrations are non-
stationary, traditional measures, such as correlation and R2, may be misleading indicators
of goodness-of-fit. A simpler alternative is to compute the mean of the quarterly absolute
deviations between the simulated and actual series as a percentage of the actual quarterly
values:
Mean Absolute Deviation ≡ 1
T
T∑
k=1
|Simulatedt − Actualt|
Actualt
. (2)
We begin with a base refinancing rate of 0.1% per month and assume that the refinancing
intensity is constant over the entire sample period. By varying the level of the refinancing
intensity function, we try to achieve a low level for the Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD)
for both our calibration series. Table 2 contains the MAD results of this calibration exercise
for three time periods: 1980–2008, 1990–2008, and 2000–2008. The results suggest that a
refinancing intensity level of 4.00% achieves the lowest level of MAD across both calibration
reference series during the 2000–2008 period, which is the most relevant period for our
purposes.
Figure 4 depicts the entire time series produced by our simulations for the combination
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MAD of Mortgages MAD of Cumulative
Outstanding(%) Equity Extractions (%)
Uniform 80-08 90-08 00-08 80-08 90-08 00-08
2.00% 24.39 23.78 21.82 33.57 32.31 26.82
2.25% 22.78 21.50 18.84 31.00 28.99 22.64
2.50% 21.07 19.15 15.88 28.26 25.49 18.42
2.75% 19.78 17.26 13.39 26.16 22.72 14.96
3.00% 18.46 15.44 11.06 24.07 20.07 11.69
3.25% 17.54 14.09 9.33 22.71 18.23 9.47
3.50% 16.46 12.58 7.42 21.37 16.48 7.75
3.75% 15.72 11.55 6.20 20.52 15.48 7.13
4.00% 15.12 10.72 5.51 19.89 14.76 7.22
4.25% 14.58 10.07 5.25 19.28 14.25 7.90
4.50% 14.32 9.74 5.32 19.13 14.15 8.76
Table 2: Summary of Mean Absolute Deviations (MAD), defined in (2), between the results
produced by our simulation approach and the calibration reference series for Total Mortgages
Outstanding and Cumulative Equity Extractions. Cash-out refinancing takes place according
to the probabilistic rule given in (1) where the Base Refinancing Rate is 0.1% per month and
the refinancing intensity is constant and given by the first element of each row. The time
series of Total Mortgages Outstanding is compared with the Total Mortgage Liability series
from Flow of Funds Accounts; the time series of Cumulative Equity Extractions is compared
with the series produced by Greenspan and Kennedy (2005) (see Section 4.3). The MAD is
reported for three different time periods to prove additional details about the success of the
calibration procedure.
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of input parameters selected. As a basis for comparison, we have shown the Total Mortgages
Outstanding series for the case of no-cash-out refinancing in Figure 4(a). While our simula-
tions capture the massive growth in the amount of mortgages outstanding and cumulative
equity extractions after 2000 very well, they fall behind the calibration series between the
mid-1980s and the late 1990s. However, since our main focus in this paper is to evaluate
risk in the mortgage system in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, the
lack of fit in earlier periods is not as problematic.
The refinancing intensity levels of 4.00% per month may seem excessively high, but
note this level is only relevant for homes that meet both the LTV and the mortgage rate
conditions in (1). To develop further intuition for this aspect of our simulation, we computed
the fraction of homes in our simulation that meet both conditions in (1). Figure 5(a) shows
the time series of the percentage of homes that meet the LTV condition of (1) and Figure 5(b)
provides the corresponding time series for the percentage of homes that meet the Mortgage
Rate condition. Figure 5(c) contains the time series for the percentage of homes that meet
both conditions; such homes are candidates for potential cash-out refinancing. It can be
seen that there are only a few periods of time, for example the early and late1990s and the
period between 2001 and 2005, during which a large fraction of homes meet both constraints
and for which the assumed 4.00% refinancing intensity represents the actual likelihood of
cash-out refinancing.
Based on the of goodness-of-fit metrics reported in Table 2 and the full time series shown
in Figure 4 we feel comfortable that our simulation under refinancing rule (1), where the
refinancing intensity is constant through time at the level of 4.00%, is properly calibrated to
assess the impact of refinancing on the systemic risk of the U.S. residential mortgage market.
We adopt this specification in our analysis of such risks in Section 5. While this rule implies
a uniform probability of cash-out refinancing, we have studied two alternative rules in which
the refinancing intensity curve is either linearly increasing in time or where the refinancing
intensity undergoes a discrete break in 1988 (as motivated by Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani,
2001). The results based on these refinancing rules are provided in Appendix A.3.
5 Options-Based Risk Analysis
Armed with a properly calibrated simulation of the U.S. residential mortgage market, we
now turn to assessing the systemic risk posed by the refinancing ratchet effect. Given our
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(a) Total Mortgages Outstanding
(b) Cumulative Equity Extractions
Figure 4: A comparison of Total Mortgages Outstanding and Cumulative Equity Extractions
produced by our simulation and Total Mortgage Liability series from Flow of Funds Accounts
data and the Cumulative Equity Extractions series of Greenspan and Kennedy (2005). Cash-
out refinancing takes place according to the probabilistic rule given in (1), where the Base
Refinancing Rate is 0.1% per month and the refinancing intensity is 4.00%.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 5: Simulated time series of the percentage of homes meeting the (a) LTV condition
in (1); (b) the MR condition in (1); (c) both conditions. The results are based on the
optimized parameters (see Table 2) with the base refinancing rate set to 0.1% per month
and the refinancing intensity equal to 4.00%/month.
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assumption that all mortgages in our simulations are non-recourse loans—collateralized only
by the value of the underlying real estate—the homeowner has a guarantee or put option
that allows him to put or “sell” the home to the lender at the remaining value of the loan
if the value of the home declines below the outstanding mortgage. Such guarantees can be
evaluated using derivatives pricing theory as described in Merton (1977) and Merton and
Bodie (1992), and can be applied to quantify macro-level risks as described in Gray, Merton,
and Bodie (2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008) and Gray and Malone (2008).
As mortgages are placed in various structured products like collateralized mortgage obli-
gations and then sold and re-sold to banks, asset management firms, or GSEs (see Figure
6), the ultimate entities exposed to these guarantees may be masked. However, it is clear
that all mortgage lenders must, in the aggregate, be holding the guarantees provided to all
homeowners. To the extent that some owners may be liable for the deficiency in their collat-
eral value through recourse, those owners share some of the burden of the loss caused by a
decline in home prices. See footnote 1 and Ghent and Kudlyak (2009) for further discussion.
Therefore, we can circumvent the complexities of these intermediate transactions—those in
the dotted box of Figure 6—and use the aggregate value of the guarantees and their various
risk metrics to evaluate the overall risk in the mortgage system.
is clear that all mortgage lenders must, in the aggregate, be holding the guarantees provided
to all homeowners.20 Therefore, we can circumvent the complexities of these intermediate
transactions—those in the dotted box of Figure 6—by calculating the aggregate value of the
guarantees and their various risk metrics that mortgage lenders have extended to homeown-
ers. We ﬁrst consider the impact of equity extractions on value of the embedded put option
extended by non-recourse mortgage lenders to home buyers in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2,
we use option theory to calculate various measures of risk for the U.S. residential mortgage
system.
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Figure 6: Interlinked balance sheet of entities backed by the underlying real estate, based on
Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2008). Intermediate risk redistributions (through, for example,
CDOs) will be ignored in our simulations.
5.1 The Value of the Aggregate Mortgage Put Option
We measure the value of the guarantee embedded in each non-recourse mortgage loan as the
value of a put option written on the underlying real estate. Since Merton’s (1977) analysis
of deposit insurance, the use of derivatives pricing models to value guarantees has become
standard. Such an approach is forward-looking by construction, providing a consistent frame-
work for estimating potential losses based on current market conditions—in particular, the
20Of course, to the extent that some owners may be liable for the deﬁciency in their collateral value through
recourse, those owners share some of the burden of the loss caused by a decline in home prices. See footnote
1 and Ghent and Kudlyak (2009) for further discussion.
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Figure 6: Interlinked balance sheet of entities backed by the underlying real estate, based on
Gray, Merton, and Bo ie (2008). Intermediate risk redistributions (through, for example,
CDOs) will be ignored in our simulations.
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5.1 The Aggregate Value of Mortgage Put Options
We measure the value of the guarantee embedded in each non-recourse mortgage as the
value of a put option written on the underlying real estate. Since Merton’s (1977) analysis
of deposit insurance, the use of derivatives pricing models to value guarantees has become
standard. Such an approach is forward-looking by construction, providing a consistent frame-
work for estimating potential losses based on current market conditions—in particular, the
price and volatility of the guaranteed asset—rather than historical experience. Of course,
derivatives pricing models do require additional assumptions, e.g., complete markets and
a specific stochastic process (one that is consistent with completeness such as geometric
Brownian motion). We adopt a discrete-time version of these assumptions in (A10):
(A10) Housing-price dynamics can be approximated by a discrete-time geometric random
walk represented by a recombining binomial tree, and markets are dynamically com-
plete so options on property values can be priced by no-arbitrage arguments alone.
Whether home prices follow random walks is debatable,11 and a number of studies have doc-
umented departures from geometric Brownian motion in several financial assets (see Lo and
MacKinlay, 1999, and the many references they provide to this burgeoning literature). How-
ever, for constructing an initial benchmark for valuing the embedded option in non-recourse
mortgages, Assumption (A10) is a natural starting point from which more sophisticated
models can be built.12
11 Certainly aggregate home price series are not consistent with geometric Brownian motions—they are far
too “smooth.” However, much of this smoothness is due to the artificial averaging implicit in all real-estate
index-construction methods. For our purposes, what matters more is the price process for individual homes
since there is an embedded put option within each mortgage. Specifically, Calhoun (1996) describes the
FHFA index construction method as extracting the component {βt} from the following time series model:
logPit = βt + Hit + Nit .
While it is true that βt is not well-approximated by a Brownian motion because it is the systematic compo-
nent of individual home prices, for our purposes, the volatility of the idiosyncratic term Hit is the key input
into determining the value of the embedded put. Therefore, the Black-Scholes model may be a reasonable
approximation for this purpose, and we use the estimated volatility of Hit reported by FHFA in our simula-
tions. To the extent that βt induces a smoother time-varying expected return, this can be addressed by the
mean-reverting diffusion processes in Lo and Wang (1995).
12Mean reversion can easily be accommodated as in Lo and Wang (1995), and the implications for option-
pricing analysis are particularly straightforward (only the drift is affected by mean reversion, implying that
the option-pricing formula is unchanged but the estimated volatility must be adjusted for serial correlation).
Another extension is to consider price dynamics that reflect the U.S. real-estate “bubble.” However, devel-
oping a precise definition of a bubble is not a simple task. For example, while some studies concluded that
real estate prices were too high in 2004–2006 (Shiller, 2006), other studies came to the opposite conclusion
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Under (A10), we model the guarantee in non-recourse mortgages as a “Bermuda” put
option—an option that can be exercised at certain dates in the future, but only on those
fixed dates—and we set these exercise dates to be once a month, just prior to each mortgage
payment date.13 The exercise price is the amount of the outstanding loan, which declines
over time due to the monthly mortgage payments. Before we can implement this option-
pricing model, we must determine the volatility of the underlying asset on which the option
is written, as well as any “dividend yield” that may affect the value of that asset. We set
these two parameters to the values reported in Table 1.
Figure 7 shows the simulated time series for the aggregate value of put options for the
cases of no-cash-out vs. cash-out refinancing using our calibrated uniform refinancing rule,
and Table 3 contains the numerical values for each quarter between 2005Q1 and 2008Q4.
During normal times, homeowners’ equity absorbs the first losses from a decline in residential
real-estate prices (see Figure 6). However, the process of equity extraction causes the size of
this buffer to decrease, resulting in a larger portion of the losses transferred to the equity-
holders and debt-holders of various mortgage-lending entities (through the complex risk
redistribution methods shown in the dotted section of Figure 6). Our simulations show that
with the downturn in residential real estate in 2007 and 2008, the value of the guarantees
extended to homeowners by mortgage lenders increased substantially. 14
(McCarthy and Peach, 2004, and Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai, 2005). Even ex post, estimating the appro-
priate “price correction” is not obvious, as Wheaton and Nechayev (2007) illustrate. This lack of consensus
underscores the empirical challenges in identifying stable relations between prices and the most obvious
fundamentals (in particular, see Gallin, 2004, 2006). But to the extent that a “bubble” refers, instead, to an
impending tail event, this case can easily be accommodated by assuming a jump component in the stochastic
process of the Home Price Index, and then using Merton’s (1976) jump-diffusion option-pricing model to
price the guarantee. Although this is a simple extension, it is likely to lead to larger loss estimates than
Assumption (A10) because of the additional tail risk component; hence we adopt the simpler assumption in
the spirit of conservatism.
13We use the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (see Cox and Rubinstein (1985)) binomial tree algorithm to price
these options, and implement it in Matlab (version 7.2) using the Financial Derivatives Toolbox (Version
4.0) and the functions: crrtimespec, crrsens, crrtree, instoptstock, intenvset, and stockspec. See
http://www.mathworks.com for documentation and additional details.
14Note that negative correlation between volatility and prices has been documented in several asset classes
(see, for example, Bekaert and Wu, 2000, for the equities case). To the extent that this negative correlation
holds in real-estate markets as well, our volatility parameter—which is an approximate long-term average—is
likely to under-estimate the realized volatility during a market downturn, which, in turn, will under-estimate
aggregate losses.
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Figure 7: Simulated time series of the aggregate value of total guarantees extended to home-
owners by mortgage lenders for cash-out and no-cash-out refinancing scenarios. For the
cash-out refinancing case, refinancing takes place according to probabilistic rule (1) in which
the base refinancing rate is 0.1% per month and the Refinancing Intensity is constant over
time and equal to 4.00%.
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5.2 U.S. Mortgage System Delta, Gamma, and Vega
The overall level of risk in the mortgage system can be calculated based on the sensitivities
of the value of mortgages’ embedded put options to changes in the level or volatility of
home prices. While the exact value of these risk metrics depends on the particular model
used for option pricing, the nature of risk in the mortgage system transcends the specifics
of the models. For example, regardless of the exact model, the value of the guarantees
increases as the value of the collateral declines. Using the language of option pricing, the
delta of the mortgage guarantees is positive. Furthermore, the rate of the increase is itself
increasing, or in the option language, the gamma is positive. To emphasize the full effect
of non-linearity, we have used our simulations to produce the value of the put guarantees
for the stock of homes that existed as of June 2006. We then subjected all home prices to
a certain percentage drop or increase in home values and recalculated the total put values.
This analysis, as shown in Figure 8, emphasizes that the non-linearity is an important aspect
of this risk. An estimate of losses based on the linear approximation would have substantially
under-estimated the true losses under price declines in the range similar to those that we
observed in the last few years. Furthermore, this figure shows that a sudden shock to the
volatility level, as is usually the case during periods of prices decline, causes the entire curve
to shift higher.
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Figure 8: Value of aggregated put options based on the calibrated simulations for June 2006
subject to different levels of drop or increase in home values.
Figure 9 and Table 3 report these metrics for the simulation based on the uniform re-
27
financing rule (we provide these metrics for alternative refinancing rules in Appendix A.3).
As reported in Table 3, in the first quarter of 2005 we estimate that the aggregate value of
all embedded put options would increase by $18.17 billion for each 1% drop in home prices.
By the last quarter of 2008, this sensitivity almost doubled to $38.13 billion for each 1%
drop in home values. This large increase is due to the large gamma of these embedded
options, as reported in Table 3. For the same simulation, the estimated gamma was $573.79
million per 1% drop in home values in the first quarter of 2005, which increased to $801.13
million for each 1% drop in home values by the last quarter of 2008. The size and increase
in the gammas of these options indicate substantial non-linearity in the risk of the mortgage
system that may need to be accounted for in systemic risk measurement and analysis. Table
3 contains delta and gamma estimates for simulations without cash-out refinancing as well.
Another aspect of risk in the mortgage system can be measured by estimating the sensi-
tivity of the value of embedded options to an increase in home price volatility, also known
as the option’s “vega.” Based on our calculations, we estimate that the total value of the
embedded put options in non-recourse mortgages would increase by approximately $70 to
$80 billion for each 1% increase in home price volatility in the years leading up to the cri-
sis. While Figure 9 shows a large increase in vega over time, during the recent crisis this
measure of risk first increased and then declined. Portfolios of options can exhibit such
counter-intuitive behavior because of the non-linearity of these metrics. For example, in the
Black-Scholes model, the vega of options way in- or out-of-the-money is low, but is quite high
for options near the money. These non-linearities can give rise to the effects documented
here for the U.S. mortgage system.
Figure 9 shows that all three risk metrics are increasing over time, even in the case of
no-cash-out refinancing. This trend is simply due to the fact that the total number of homes
(along with population) is increasing over time. To normalize this effect, and to develop a
better sense for the relative increase as well as the timing of the increase in these metrics,
we have plotted the ratios of the cash-out vs. no-cash-out delta, gamma, and vega measures
for the heterogeneous inputs case in Figure 10. Comparing the pattern observed with the
drivers of the refinancing intensity shown in Figure 5, we can see the ratios of these risk
measures increase when both drivers of refinancing activity are present. For example, the
ratios remained relatively stable from the 1960s to the early 1980s. During this period,
although most homeowners met the LTV condition of our refinancing driver (see Figure
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5(a)), the high level of interest rates implied that only a small portion of the population was
in a favorable state to refinance (Figure 5(b)). The first shift in the three ratios occurred in
the mid-1980s as interest rates fell while home prices remained high, causing large increases
in overall refinancing activity. Refinancing activity slowed down in the early 1990s due to
the drop in home prices during this period (Figure 5(a)). The next major shift occurred in
the early 2000s due to the combination of interest-rate declines and home price appreciation.
In fact, the three ratios began declining in 2006 as home prices declined, indicating that the
risk metrics increased at a higher rate for simulations with no-cash-out refinancing relative
to those with cash-out refinancing.
In summary, we see that the refinancing ratchet effect causes the greatest increases in
the three relative risk measures during periods when home prices are stable or increasing,
and interest rates are declining.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 9: Simulated time series of the sensitivities of the aggregate value of total guarantees
extended to homeowners by mortgage lenders for cash-out and no-cash-out refinancing sce-
narios. Figure (a) plots the sensitivity to a 1% drop in home prices, Figure (b) plots the rate
of change of (a) with respect to home prices, and Figure (c) plots the sensitivity to a 1%
increase in home price volatility. For the cash-out refinancing case, refinancing takes place
according to probabilistic rule (1) in which the base refinancing rate is 0.1% per month and
the refinancing intensity is constant over time and equal to 4.00%.
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Figure 10: The simulated time series of the ratios of the delta, gamma, and vega for cash-out
versus no-cash-out refinancing simulations. In the simulation with no-cash-out refinancing,
refinancing takes place according to the Uniform (4%) rule. For the cash-out refinancing
case, refinancing takes place according to probabilistic rule (1) in which the base refinancing
rate is 0.1% per month and the refinancing intensity is constant over time and equal to
4.00%.
5.3 Sensitivity to Model Parameters and the Refinancing Rule
The accuracy of the simulation results of Sections 5.1 and 5.2 depends, of course, on the
values of the various parameters of our simulations, as well as the assumed form of the
behavioral refinancing intensity function. We have conducted a series of sensitivity analyses
that we will summarize in this section.
We first consider the estimates for the aggregate value of the put options in non-recourse
mortgage loans under the two alternative refinancing rules. As reported in Table 4, the
results are remarkably stable across different refinancing rules. This stability is likely due to
the fact that each of these rules is calibrated to match the two reference series in Section 4.3
(See Appendix A.3).
To gauge the sensitivity of our simulations to the rent yield and home price volatility
assumptions, we performed additional simulations for rent yields of 3% and 5%, and home
price volatilities of 6% and 10%. To conserve space, we have reported only the resulting
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estimates for the total put value under these parameter values in Table 5. These results
show that in the fourth quarter of 2008, the simulated loss estimates range from a low
of $1,241 billion (3% rent yield, 6% volatility) to a high of $2,256 billion (5% rent yield,
10% volatility). As volatility increases, or as the rent yield increases, ceteris paribus, the
embedded guarantee becomes more valuable. While rent yields may be relatively stable over
time, it can be argued that home price volatility is more variable. In particular, as the
national home price index reached its peak in June 2006 and began to decline, home price
volatility is likely to have increased significantly beyond historical levels, which implies that
our estimates for the aggregate put value may under-estimate actual losses. Tables A.6–A.8
in Appendix A.4 provide similar sensitivity analyses for the estimated delta, gamma, and
vega measures for the aggregate put.
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6 Discussion
In this section, we present a number of qualifications, extensions, and implications of our
simulation of the U.S. residential housing market. In Section 6.1, we contrast the heuristic
nature of our simulations to traditional general equilibrium analysis. We acknowledge in
Section 6.2 that we have not modeled the behavior of lenders in our simulations. We distin-
guish between market risk and systemic risk in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4 we observe that
the welfare implications of the recent financial crisis, and the events leading up to it, are not
yet fully understood.
6.1 Heuristic vs. General Equilibrium Analysis
Our simulations are based on a number of simplifying assumptions. While we have attempted
to err on the side of lower implied losses whenever possible, some assumptions may have the
opposite effect, e.g., assuming that all mortgages are non-recourse loans. Incorporating more
realistic features of the housing market, such as adjustable-rate and negative-amortization
mortgages with teaser rates, NINJA loans, and regional differences in the U.S. residential
real-estate market, bankruptcy laws, and homeowner asset and income dynamics, may in-
crease the accuracy of the simulation.
However, our analysis is not designed to capture feedback effects among all endogenous
variables such as home prices, interest rates, household income, and borrowing and lending
behavior. Therefore, standard comparative-statics questions, such as “How much would
home prices have risen if the Fed had not cut interest rates from 2000 to 2003?”, are not
addressed in our simulations. Instead, our narrower reduced-form focus has been to gauge
the magnitude of the refinancing ratchet effect on mortgage lenders. A more formal general-
equilibrium analysis of these markets would begin with optimizing households from which the
demand for housing and mortgages are derived, aggregated, and equilibrated with optimizing
home builders and mortgage lenders that supply the homes and mortgages, respectively, to
households. While computable general equilibrium models have become considerably more
sophisticated in recent years (see, for example, Dixon and Rimmer, 2002), the dynamic
and stochastic nature of the demand and supply decisions are sufficiently complex, even
for a single agent, that constructing a true stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model
of the entire U.S. housing market seems computationally impractical. Nevertheless, some
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useful insights may be gleaned from considering special cases of such optimizing behavior
and equilibrium, e.g., Pliska (2006), Fortin et al. (2007), and Agarwal, Driscoll, and Laibson
(2008), which may be worth pursuing further.
6.2 Lending Behavior
Any analysis of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 would not be complete without some
discussion of the behavior of mortgage lenders and associated businesses. Our simulations
assume that all household demand for mortgages and refinancing is satisfied at prevailing
historical rates, i.e., the supply of funds to borrowers is infinitely elastic at all times. While
this may have been a reasonable approximation to reality during the decade prior to the peak
of the housing market in 2006, our motivation for this simplifying assumption is to gauge the
impact of the refinancing ratchet effect in isolation. However, supply shocks certainly must
have had an impact on systemic risk in recent years as well. Therefore, an important open
question is how lenders behaved during the course of our simulations, and what economic or
behavioral forces led them to engage in such behavior.
A tractable and empirically plausible model of lending behavior is beyond the scope of
our current simulation, and it deserves a separate set of simulation studies in its own right
(one possible starting point is Thurner, Farmer, and Geanakoplos, 2009). However, it is
not difficult to speculate about the factors those simulations might include. In addition to
modeling the behavior of banks, which are the traditional sources of home loans, such a sim-
ulation must also account for a host of financial innovations that have emerged only recently,
including securitized debt (e.g., CDOs and CDO-squareds), credit default swaps and related
insurance products, Internet-based marketing of consumer-finance products, the growth of
the “shadow banking industry” and illiquidity, and the globalization of financial markets.
Chan et al. (2006), Rajan (2006), Gorton (2008, 2009), Brunnermeier (2009), and Gorton
and Metrick (2009) provide overviews of some of these developments. In addition, these
simulations must incorporate the impact of rating agencies, GSEs, and broader government
policies in promoting cheap financing for would-be homeowners, as well as the increasing
competition for yield among asset-managers and asset-owners. Collectively, these develop-
ments contributed to the enormous supply of funds available to homeowners during the past
decade, but further analysis is needed before we can determine the relative importance of
each.
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The challenge in constructing a simulation with all of these features is the fact that
there is precious little history on which to calibrate many of the parameters. In contrast
to typical simulations that assume a statistically stationary environment, simulating the
supply of funds for residential real-estate purchases involves the historically unique financial
innovations described above. This simulation may provide a clue as to the magnitude of
the current crisis, as well as its apparent uniqueness in recent history. The mechanism
discussed in this paper is surely relevant when comparing impact of housing-price crashes
across countries. As discussed in Hubbard and Mayer (2010), many countries experienced
similar housing-price growth driven by comparable trends in real interest rates. In a country
where cash-out refinancing is easier or more common—perhaps because of familiarity or other
social characteristics—a larger portion of the increase in homeowner’s equity is extracted by
the owner. This would, in turn, cause more synchronization in homeowners’ leverage and
more severe losses for lenders in the wake of home-price declines.
More importantly, the main thrust of our analysis is that the refinancing ratchet effect
is a wholly separate mechanism that operates irrespective of the supply of credit, and one
that must be considered a potential source of systemic risk in its own right.
6.3 Market Risk vs. Systemic Risk
While the $1.7 trillion figure seems imposing, large financial losses do not necessarily imply
significant systemic risk. For example, on April 14, 2000, the CRSP value-weighted stock
market index (excluding dividends) declined by 6.63%, implying an aggregate one-day loss
of approximately $1.04 trillion to corporate America. While certainly unfortunate, this
event was not particularly memorable, nor was it a cause for national alarm or emergency
government intervention. Market risk is distinct from systemic risk; the latter arises when
large financial losses affect important economic entities that are unprepared for and unable
to withstand such losses, causing a cascade of failures and widespread loss of confidence.
This element of surprise lies at the heart of the recent financial crisis. The fact that the
three conditions that cause the refinancing ratchet effect—rising house prices, falling interest
rates, and easy access to refinancing opportunities—are individually innocuous and are often
viewed as signs of economic growth and prosperity creates the element of surprise. Therefore,
not only is the magnitude of losses caused by the refinancing ratchet effect large, but these
losses are also more likely to come as a surprise to the parties involved, resulting in systemic
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risk to the financial system.
6.4 Welfare Implications
Although much has already been written about the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, its welfare
implications for homeowners, lenders, and intermediaries are not yet fully understood. While
many homeowners have been adversely affected by higher interest rates, foreclosures, and
falling property values, there are other satisfied and solvent homeowners who are homeowners
only because of the business practices, government policies, and economic circumstances
that contributed to the refinancing ratchet effect. Eliminating or otherwise restricting these
business practices and policies may benefit some groups, but it will no doubt disadvantage
others. Moreover, as discussed above, we have not attempted to model the supply side of
the refinancing industry, which no doubt contributed to the growth of home prices, leverage
ratios, and systemic risk. Many have criticized the role of securitization, insurance, and
financial innovation in creating the crisis, but during the decade leading up to the peak of
the housing market in 2006, these developments were responsible for the low-interest-rate and
easy-credit environment that was so conducive to global economic growth and the “ownership
society.” Any policy recommendations with respect to the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 must
balance these myriad trade-offs between individual and institutional stakeholders.
7 Conclusions
During periods of rising house prices, falling interest rates, and increasingly competitive and
efficient refinancing markets, cash-out refinancing is like a ratchet, incrementally increasing
homeowner leverage as real-estate values appreciate without the ability to symmetrically
decrease leverage by increments as real-estate values decline. Using a numerical simulation
calibrated to the basic time-series properties of U.S. residential housing market, we show
that this ratchet effect is capable of generating the magnitude of losses suffered by mortgage
lenders during the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. During normal times, and in the absence
of cash-out refinancing, the cross-sectional distribution of leverage among homeowners is
relatively heterogeneous, with newer homeowners more highly leveraged than those who
have had the opportunity to build more equity. Heterogeneity of leverage in the cross section
implies fewer correlated defaults among borrowers and lower systemic risk.
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However, during periods of falling interest rates and rising house prices, most homeowners
will have an incentive to refinance. If the refinancing market is so competitive and efficient
that homeowners refinance frequently, this pattern of behavior has an effect on systemic risk
similar to the one that would occur if these homeowners all purchased their homes at the
same time, at peak prices, with newly issued mortgages at the highest allowable LTV ratios.
A coordinated increase in leverage among homeowners during good times will lead to sharply
higher correlations in defaults among those same homeowners in bad times. Our simulations
show that this effect alone is enough to generate $1.7 trillion in losses for mortgage-lending
institutions since June 2006.
These observations have important implications for risk management practices and reg-
ulatory reform. The fact that the refinancing ratchet effect arises only when three market
conditions are simultaneously satisfied demonstrates that the recent financial crisis is subtle
and may not be attributable to a single cause. Moreover, a number of the activities that
gave rise to these three conditions are likely to be ones that we would not want to sharply
curtail or outright ban because they are individually beneficial. While excessive risk-taking,
overly aggressive lending practices, pro-cyclical regulations, and political pressures surely
contributed to the recent problems in the U.S. housing market, our simulations show that
even if all homeowners, lenders, investors, insurers, rating agencies, regulators, and policy-
makers behaved rationally, ethically, and with the purest of motives, financial crises could
still occur. Therefore, we must acknowledge the possibility that no easy legislative or regula-
tory solutions may exist. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a,b) have documented, financial crises
occur on a regular basis throughout the world and are often tied to economic growth, capital
inflows, and financial liberalization and innovation. Successfully managing systemic risk will
require flexible, creative, and well-trained professionals who understand the fundamental
drivers of such risk, not static rules meant to prevent history from repeating.
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A Appendix
In this Appendix, we describe the components of Greenspan and Kennedy’s (2005) gross eq-
uity extraction time series used in our analysis (Section A.1), our methods for constructing
all of the variables used as inputs in calibrating our simulations (Section A.2), calibration
results for two alternative refinancing intensity specifications (Section A.3), and some ad-
ditional sensitivity analysis for our option-pricing analysis of the embedded put options in
non-recourse mortgages (Section A.4).
A.1 Components of Gross Equity Extractions Series
Greenspan and Kennedy (2005) (hereafter “GK”) propose a method for disaggregating the
net change in outstanding home mortgage debt into its constituent gross flows. For our pur-
poses, the most important series produced by their approach is the Gross Equity Extractions
series, and for completeness, we provide a brief overview of this series in this section. Please
see their paper for further details.
GK define Gross Equity Extractions as “extraction of equity on existing homes as the
discretionary initiatives of home owners to convert equity in their homes into cash by borrow-
ing in the home mortgage market.” To calculate gross equity extractions, they hypothesize
that the change in home mortgage debt outstanding in the absence of discretionary initia-
tives would have been equal to the mortgage origination to purchase new homes minus the
scheduled amortization. Accordingly, they define gross equity extractions as the difference
between the actual change in total home mortgage debt outstanding and this quantity. More
precisely, they use the following relationship:
Gross Equity Extractions ≡ Change in home mortgage debt outstanding
excluding construction loans
− Origination for new homes
+ Scheduled amortization .
Using a variety of sources, they are able to estimate this quantity at a quarterly frequency
since 1968Q1. This series is one of the two primary reference time series that we use to
calibrate our simulations.
With a more detailed set of data sources that are only available since 1991, GK further
decompose gross equity extractions into the following three components from 1991Q1 to
2008Q4:
Turnover Extractions ≡ Origination to purchase existing homes
− Cancellation of home-seller’s mortgage
Gross Cash-Out ≡ Origination for refinancing
− Cancellation of refinanced loans
Net Change in Home Equity Loans ≡ Change in home equity loans outstanding
41
− Unscheduled repayments .
Figure A.1 plots these three components at a quarterly frequency from 1991Q1 to 2008Q4.
Figure A.1 plots these three components at a quarterly frequency from 1991Q1 to 2008Q4.
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Figure A.1: Three component of the Gross Equity Extractions series of Greenspan and
Kennedy (2005) from 1991Q1 to 2008Q4. The three components are: “Turnover Extractions”
(origination to purchase existing homes minus cancellation of home sellers mortgage), “Gross
Cash-Out” (defined as origination for refinancing minus cancellation of refinanced loans), and
“Net Change in Home Equity Loans” (defined as change in home equity loans outstanding
minus unscheduled repayments). See Greenspan and Kennedy (2005) for further details.
Our choice to calibrate our simulations to the Gross Equity Extractions series rather than
to one of the three subcomponents is motivated by our focus on systemic risk. In particular,
our refinancing behavioral rules (3) and (4) are meant to capture the aggregate effects of
all three components of the Gross Equity Extractions series. As we discussed in Section
3.2 in reference to Assumption (A9), this broader focus is more relevant for aggregate risk
measurement because all three components contribute to the total leverage of the residential
housing market. In particular, in the example of Section 3.2 in which a homeowner decides
to sell his home and rent thereafter, he would fall into the “Turnover Extraction” case
but the buyer of his home presumably finances the purchase with a similarly leveraged
loan, yielding virtually the same impact on aggregate leverage as if the original homeowner
continued owning after engaging in a cash-out refinancing (place him in the “Gross Cash-
Out” category). Therefore, for our purposes, combining the three disaggregated series of
Greenspan and Kennedy (2005) seems more appropriate.
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Figure A.1: Three components of the Gross Equity Extractions series of Greenspan and
Kennedy (2005), from 1991Q1 to 2008Q4. The three components are: “Turnover Extrac-
tions” (originations to rchase existing homes minus cancellation f home-seller’s mort-
gage), “Gross Cash-Out” (defined as originations for refinancing minus cancellation of re-
financed loans), and “Net Change in Home Equity Loans” (defined as the change in home
equity loans outstanding minus unscheduled repayments). See Greenspan and Kennedy
(2005) for further details.
Our choice to calibrate our simulations to the Gross Equity Extractions series rather than
to one of the three subcomponents is motivated by our focus on systemic risk. In particular,
the probabilistic refinancing rule (1) is meant to capture the aggregate effects of all three
components f the Gross Equity Extractions series. As we discussed in Section 4.1, this
broader focus is more relevant for aggregate risk measurement because all three components
contribute to the total leverage of the residential housing market. In particular, in the
example of Section 4.1 in which a homeowner decides to sell his hom n rent thereafter,
he would fall into the “Turnover Extraction” case, but the buyer of his home presumably
finances the purchase with a similarly leveraged loan, yielding virtually the same impact on
aggregate leverage as if the original homeowner continued owning after engaging in a cash-
out refinancing (place him in the “Gross Cash-Out” category). Therefore, for our purposes,
combining the three GK disaggregated series seems more appropriate.
A.2 Construction of Input Series
In this section, we describe the steps we followed to construct the various time series used
as inputs to our simulation:
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1. Home Price Appreciation. We use three sources to assemble this series. Prior
to 1975Q1, we use the nominal home price index collected by Robert Shiller. From
1975Q1 to 1986Q4, we use the national house price index from the FHFA.15 Given
the importance of this variable for our simulation, we considered two other home price
series using different data in the more recent period, but because the results did not
differ significantly from those based on HPIt, we have omitted them to conserve space.
16
For the most recent history (since January 1987), we use the S&P/Case-Shiller Composite-
10 Home Price Index. For the simulation in which we introduce geographical het-
erogeneity in home price appreciation, we use the 10 individual components of the
S&P/Case-Shiller Index. We use the same weighting scheme followed by the Composite-
10 index, given in Table 1.17
2. New Homes Entering the Mortgage System. We construct this time series from
a variety of sources. The time series of “New One-Family Houses Sold” available from
the U.S. Census Bureau is the starting point.18 This series is available monthly since
January 1963. However, it includes only homes built for sale and excludes homes
built by homeowners and contractors. To take such cases into account, we use data
collected by the U.S. Census Bureau on the intent of completed home constructions.19
This construction data separates the completed units by their intent—units in the
“Built for Sale” category correspond to homes that will be reported in the “New One-
Family Houses Sold” upon the completion of a sale transaction. We take the sum
of construction numbers reported under the “Contractor-Built,” “Owner-Built,” and
“Multi-Units Built for Sale” categories, and use the ratio of this sum to the number
of “One-Family Units Built for Sale” to adjust the “New One-Family Houses Sold”
15See http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=87. The relevant data may be found in the “All-
Transactions Indexes” section. These two series are only available at a quarterly and annual frequency,
respectively, and to be consistent with the rest of our simulation, we convert them into monthly series as-
suming geometric growth. Specifically, for months other than March, June, September, and December, HPIt
is computed as:
HPIt = exp
[
log(HPIQ−) + (t− tQ−) log
(
HPIQ+
HPIQ−
)]
where HPIQ− denotes the quarterly index value from the previous quarter, and HPIQ+ denotes the quarterly
index value from the current quarter. The approach for interpolating monthly observations from annual data
is similar.
16 Specifically, we define CSNAT-HPIt and NAR-HPIt using the same data as HPIt for the earlier part of
the simulation period, but CSNAT-HPIt uses the S&P/Case-Shiller Composite-10 Home Price Index price
since 1987Q1, and NAR-HPIt uses the appreciation in the median price of existing homes sold as reported
by the National Association of Realtors, which is available since January 1999. Because the Case-Shiller
Index is only available at a quarterly frequency, we construct monthly observations for this variable via
interpolation assuming geometric growth. Simulation results based on these home price series are available
from the authors upon request.
17See the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices Index Methodology document on Standard & Poor’s
website.
18See http://www.census.gov/const/www/newressalesindex.html.
19See http://www.census.gov/const/www/newresconstindex excel.html. The relevant data may be
found in “Quarterly Housing Completions by Purpose of Construction and Design Type”. We use the annual
series since it is available since 1974 (quarterly data only goes back to 1999).
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Geographical Region Case-Shiller Symbol Weight (%)
Boston BOXR 7.4
Chicago CHXR 8.9
Denver DNXR 3.7
Las Vegas LVXR 1.5
Los Angeles LXXR 21.2
Miami MIXR 5.0
New York NYXR 27.2
San Diego SDXR 5.5
San Francisco SFXR 11.8
Washington, D.C. WDXR 7.8
Table A.1: Weights of the regional indexes within the S&P/Case-Shiller Composite-10 Home
Price Index. Source: S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices Index Methodology.
series.20 For example, in 1974 this ratio is 1.06, therefore we multiply the monthly
“New One-Family Houses Sold” by a factor of 1+1.06 = 2.06 in each month during
1974 to estimate the total number of units entering the mortgage system that year.
For the period from 1963 to 1973, this ratio is not available (see footnote 19), so we will
use the average of the adjustment factor from 1974 to 1983 to make the adjustments
prior to 1974. This yields values of NHt back to January 1963.
However, the useful life of a typical home is often greater than 46 years (1963 to 2008),
hence we may be omitting a significant fraction of homes with current mortgages if NHt
only starts in January 1963. Based on data from the 2007 American Housing Survey,
approximately 93% of homes surveyed were built after 1919.21 Therefore, we chose to
extend NHt back to January 1919 to yield a more realistic time series for the stock of
U.S. residential real estate in more recent years. We now describe the statistical model
used to “backfill”the new home sales time series from January 1919 to December 1962.
We begin by hypothesizing that the growth rate in NHt is related to the growth in
population. Higher values of NHt also seem to be correlated with periods of high
real home price appreciation such as the earlier part of this decade. Accordingly, we
first collect data for annual new home sales, population, and real home prices. The
population data are obtained from two sources: data from 1900 to 1999 are obtained
20We have excluded the “Multi-Units Built for Rent” category because our focus is the mortgage liability
of the Personal sector. Mortgages for multi-units built for rent, such as large apartment buildings, are
typically held outside of the Personal sector. However, some of these units may eventually be converted into
condominiums and sold to individual buyers, which will not be captured in our simulations.
21See http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/nationaldata.html. The relevant data is given
in Table A-1.
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from
http : //www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclockest.txt
and data from 2000 to 2008 are obtained from
http : //www.census.gov/popest/national/files/NST− EST2008− alldata.csv.
The Real Home Price Index is obtained from Robert Shiller at
http : //www.econ.yale.edu/∼shiller/data.htm.
We then transform each of these series into growth rates by taking the first difference
of the natural logarithms of the original time series, i.e.,
∆NHt = log(NHt+1)− log(NHt) for t ∈ {1963, . . . , 2008}
∆POPt = log(POPt+1)− log(POPt) for t ∈ {1919, . . . , 2008}
∆HPIt = log(HPIt+1)− log(HPIt) for t ∈ {1919, . . . , 2008}
We then estimate the following linear model:
∆NHt = α + β∆POPt + γ∆HPIt . (A.1)
The estimated parameters, αˆ, βˆ, and γˆ, and the data for ∆POPt and ∆HPIt from 1919
to 1962 are used to construct the left-hand-side variable ∆ˆNHt for this period. We use
NH1963 and ∆ˆNHt to backfill NHt from 1919 to 1962 through the following calculation:
log(N̂Ht) = log(NH1963)−
1962∑
i=t
∆ˆNHi for t ∈ {1919, . . . , 1962} . (A.2)
In the final step, we use the empirical distribution of monthly new home sales estimated
using monthly data from 1963 to 2008 to construct monthly estimates based on the
annual estimates of N̂Ht constructed using the method above. Given NHi,t, i.e., the
sales in month i of year t for years 1963 to 2008, we estimate the proportion of houses
constructed in month i using the following estimator:
Pi =
1
2008− 1963 + 1
2008∑
t=1963
NHi,t
NHt
. (A.3)
Combining (A.2) and (A.3), we set the number of new houses entering the mortgage
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system in month i of year t over the period from 1919 to 1962 to be:
N̂Hi,t = N̂Ht × Pi for t ∈ {1919, . . . , 1962} . (A.4)
Figure A.2 shows the actual and estimated time series of the number of new units
entering the mortgage system from January 1919 to December 2008. This approach
implies that 101.5 million units enter our simulation. Of this total, 52.6 million are
based on actual data from January 1963 to December 2008, and 48.9 million are based
on the estimation approach outlined above for the period from January 1919 to Decem-
ber 1962. The total of 101.5 million seems reasonable given our objective of capturing
more than 90% of the homes in the U.S.
constructed in month i using the following estimator:
Pi =
1
2008− 1963 + 1
2008∑
t=1963
NHi,t
NHt
(A.3)
Combining (A.2) and (A.3), we set the number of new houses entering the mortgage
system in month i of year t over the period from 1919 to 1962 to be:
N̂Hi,t = N̂Ht × Pi for t ∈ {1919, . . . , 1962} . (A.4)
Figure A.2 shows the actual and estimated time series of the number of new units
entering the mortgage system from January 1919 to December 2008. This approach
implies that 101.5MM units enter our simulation. Of this total, 52.6MM is based
on actual data from January 1963 to December 2008, and 48.9MM is based on the
estimation approach outlined above for the period from January 1919 to December
1962. The total of 101.5MM seems reasonable given our objective of capturing more
than 90% of the homes in the U.S.
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Figure A.2: Time series of the number of units of new homes entering the mortgage system
since January 1919. This series is used as an input to our simulations. The data since
January 1963 is available from the U.S. Census Bureau, and we have extrapolated the data
back to 1919 based on a linear-regression model using population growth and a real-estate
price index as regressors.
3. New Houses Purchase PriceWe begin by constructing a time series for the average
home price since 1919. We will use the average home price available from the U.S.
Census Bureau for “New One-Family Houses Sold” in the period from January 1975 to
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Figure A.2: Time series of the number of units of new homes entering the mortgage system
since January 1919. This series is used as an input to our simulations. The data since
January 1963 is available from the U.S. Census Bureau, and we have extrapolated the data
back to 1919 based on a linear-regression model using population growth and a real-estate
price index as regressors.
3. New Home Purchase Price. We begin by constructing a time series for the average
home price since 1919. We will use the average home price available from the U.S.
Census Bureau for “New One-Family Houses Sold” in the period from January 1975 to
December 2008. For the period from January 1963 to January 1975, the average price
is not available. However, the Census reports the median sale price for this period,
which we will use as our starting point. From January 1975 to December 2008, when
both mean and median home prices are available, we observe that the mean price is
typically higher than the median by approximately 5%, and the ratio has increased in
more recent history. To make our simulations more accurate, we multiply the reported
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median prices in the January-1963-to-December-1974 sample by 1.05, i.e., we inflate
the median by 5%, and use the resulting values to complete the NHPt series. From
January 1919 to December 1962, we will use the growth rate of HPIt to backfill sales
prices, starting with the sales price in January 1963.
We then use data from the 2007 American Housing Survey to create a distribution
around the average price series. The details of these calculations are given in Table
A.2. We start with the price range and number of homes in each given price range
from the 2007 American Housing Survey (columns 1 and 2 of Table A.2). We then
assign a single price level to each price range, given in column 3, and calculate the
average price using the assigned price level and counts. In this case, the average was
calculated to be $125,420. Then we computed the “Weight” (column 4) as the number
of homes in each price range as a percentage of the total number of homes surveyed in
the American Housing Survey, and the “Price Multiplier” (in column 5) as the ratio
of the assigned price level of each price range to the calculated mean purchase price of
$125,420. We use the calculated weights and price multiplier to create a distribution
around the time series of average purchase price we constructed in the previous steps.
American Housing American Housing Price Assigned Weight Price
Survey Range Survey Count to This Bin (%) Multiplier
Less than $10,000 2,897 $10,000 4.0 0.08
$10,000 to $19,999 4,413 $15,000 7.0 0.12
$20,000 to $29,999 3,837 $25,000 6.0 0.20
$30,000 to $39,999 3,645 $35,000 6.0 0.28
$40,000 to $49,999 3,184 $45,000 5.0 0.36
$50,000 to $59,999 3,129 $55,000 5.0 0.44
$60,000 to $69,999 3,115 $65,000 5.0 0.52
$70,000 to $79,999 3,009 $75,000 5.0 0.60
$80,000 to $99,999 5,563 $90,000 8.0 0.72
$100,000 to $119,999 4,216 $110,000 6.0 0.88
$120,000 to $149,999 6,320 $135,000 10.0 1.08
$150,000 to $199,999 7,581 $175,000 12.0 1.40
$200,000 to $249,999 4,522 $225,000 7.0 1.79
$250,000 to $299,999 2,820 $275,000 4.0 2.19
$300,000 or more 7,483 $300,000 10.0 2.39
Average $125,420
Table A.2: Data from the 2007 American Housing Survey (Table 3–14) used in calculating
the distribution of home purchase price around the average-price time series.
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4. Initial Loan-to-Value Ratio. Finding actual data about the initial LTV ratio is
surprisingly difficult. In in lieu of actual data, we have assumed that the initial LTV
ratio is uniformly distributed between 75% and 95%.
5. Initial Mortgage Maturity. Another input to our simulations is the initial maturity
and type of mortgage used. As discussed in the main text, we have assumed that
all mortgages are standard fully-amortizing mortgages over a fixed interval in our
simulations. Based on the data from Table 3–15 of the 2007 American Housing Survey,
out of the 41,567 participants that reported their type of mortgage, 37,876 or 91.1%
reported using “fixed payment, self-amortizing” mortgages. Therefore our assumption
of standard mortgages in our simulation seems to be a plausible starting point.
Table A.3 contains some data from the 2007 American Housing Survey on initial ma-
turities. In our simulations, we assume 80% of the mortgages have a 30-year maturity
period at origination, with the remaining 20% having a 15-year maturity.
Term of Primary Mortgage at Count Percent
Origination or Assumption Total
Less than 8 years 1,243 3
8 to 12 years 1,340 3
13 to 17 years 6,594 14
18 to 22 years 2,573 6
23 to 27 years 912 2
28 to 32 years 32,641 70
33 years or more 1,092 2
Variable 66 0
Table A.3: Data from Table 3–15 of the 2007 American Housing Survey on mortgage matu-
rities at origination.
6. Long-Term Risk-Free Rate. We use the yield on 30-year constant-maturity U.S.
Treasury securities, which is available from February 1977 to December 2008, but with
a gap between March 2002 to January 2006. We fill this gap using yields on 20-year
constant maturity Treasury securities.22 For the period prior to February 1977, we will
use the “Long Rate” collected by Robert Shiller,23 which is only available annually, so
we use linear interpolation to obtain monthly observations.
7. Mortgage Rates For 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rates, we use the series constructed
22See http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/statisticsdata.htm.
23See http://www.econ.yale.edu/∼shiller/data.htm.
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by Freddie Mac, which starts in April 1971.24 For the earlier period, we simply add
150 bps to the long-term risk-free rates RFt (see above), which is approximately the
average spread between 30-year mortgage rates and RFt for the period from April
1971 to December 2008. For 15-year mortgage rates, we use the data from Freddie
Mac which starts in September 1991. For the earlier period, we backfill this series by
subtracting 46 bps from 30-year mortgage rates, which is approximately the difference
between 30-year and 15-year mortgage rates in the post-September-1991 period for
which we have access to data for both series from Freddie Mac.
A.3 Calibration Results for Alternative Refinancing Rules
In this section we provide calibration results for two alternative refinancing intensity func-
tions in the context of our probabilistic refinancing rule (1). In Table A.4, we present results
for a refinancing intensity function that starts at zero and linearly increases through time
reaching its maximum level in 2008, as given by the first element of each row. Table A.5
provides results of a similar calibration excercise for a rule that is uniform before and after
1988 but undergoes a level shift in 1988. This form for the refinancing intensity is motivated
by Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani (2001). The level of refinancing intensity before and after
1988 are given by the first two numbers listed in each row. Figure A.3 compares the total
mortgages outstanding and the cumulative equity extraction under the properly calibrated
rule from each of these two specifications.
A.4 Additional Sensitivity Analysis of Option-based Risk Metrics
Tables A.6–A.8 show the sensitivity of estimated delta, vega, and gamma values, respectively,
to different volatility and rent yield assumptions. These tables are comparable to Table 5
which shows the sensitivity of the estimated put values to different volatility and rent yield
assumptions.
24See http://www.freddiemac.com/dlink/html/PMMS/display/PMMSOutputYr.jsp. The section “30-
Year Fixed-Rate Historic Tables” contains the relevant data.
49
MAD of Mortgages MAD of Cumulative
Outstanding(%) Equity Extractions (%)
Linear 80-08 90-08 00-08 80-08 90-08 00-08
3.00% 21.29 19.00 14.60 32.00 26.89 17.63
3.25% 20.16 17.37 12.57 30.01 24.41 14.72
3.50% 19.22 16.02 10.71 28.36 22.37 12.10
3.75% 18.17 14.54 8.83 26.66 20.29 9.75
4.00% 17.31 13.32 7.40 25.44 18.82 8.44
4.25% 16.63 12.40 6.42 24.36 17.71 7.81
4.50% 16.05 11.63 5.84 23.58 16.92 7.78
4.75% 15.65 11.13 5.58 23.09 16.58 8.33
5.00% 15.31 10.71 5.54 22.57 16.14 8.91
Table A.4: Mean Absolute Deviations (MAD), as defined in (2), between the simulated total
mortgages outstanding time series vs. the Total Mortgage Liability time series from the Flow
of Funds Accounts data, and the cumulative equity extractions vs. the series produced by
Greenspan and Kennedy (2005), for three different time periods. The cash-out refinancing
takes place according to probabilistic rule (1), where the Base Refinancing Rate is 0.1% per
month and the refinancing intensity increases linearly from 1919 to 2008 and reaches a peak
value given by the first element of each row of this table.
MAD of Mortgages MAD of Cumulative
Outstanding(%) Equity Extractions (%)
Uniform with Break in 1988 80-08 90-08 00-08 80-08 90-08 00-08
2.50%-3.00% 18.91 15.83 11.42 25.18 20.75 12.32
2.75%-3.25% 17.79 14.23 9.44 23.30 18.38 9.58
3.00%-3.50% 16.78 12.82 7.57 22.10 16.82 7.90
3.25%-3.75% 15.95 11.67 6.30 21.03 15.58 7.14
3.50%-4.00% 15.30 10.79 5.54 20.41 14.88 7.24
3.75%-4.25% 14.83 10.21 5.26 19.84 14.49 7.96
4.00%-4.50% 14.47 9.78 5.31 19.48 14.19 8.83
4.25%-4.75% 14.31 9.57 5.51 19.25 14.01 9.43
4.50%-5.00% 14.07 9.34 5.82 19.02 13.87 10.29
Table A.5: Mean Absolute Deviations (MAD), as defined in (2), between the simulated total
mortgages outstanding time series vs. the Total Mortgage Liability time series from the Flow
of Funds Accounts data, and the cumulative equity extractions vs. the series produced by
Greenspan and Kennedy (2005), for three different time periods. The cash-out refinancing
takes place according to probabilistic rule (1), where the base refinancing rate is 0.1% per
month and the refinancing intensity is constant between 1919 and 1988, and then jumps to
a higher level in 1988 and remains at that new level until 2008. The initial level and the
level after the jump in 1988 are given by the first element of each row of this table.
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(a) Mortgages Outstanding
(b) Cumulative Equity Extractions
Figure A.3: The simulated times series of total mortgages outstanding and cumulative equity
extraction compared to the Total Mortgage Liability series from Flow of Funds Accounts data
and the cumulative equity extractions series produced by Greenspan and Kennedy (2005).
The cash-out refinancing takes place according to probabilistic rule (1), where the base
refinancing rate is 0.1% per month and the refinancing intensity follows a calibrated Linear
or Uniform-with-Structural-Break-in-1988 profile as given in Tables A.4 and A.5. Specifically,
the refinancing intensity is either linearly increasing from 1919 to 2008 and reaching a peak
of 4.5%, or the refinancing intensity is constant except for a structural break in 1988 where
the levels are 3.75% and 4.25% before and after the break, respectively.
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